Asia-Pacific Space Force Capability Structure Report 2022: Multi-domain Army Concepts, Dual-use Technologies, and Cyber-resilience Framework to Drive Future Technology Strategy

December 20, 2022

Dublin, Dec. 20, 2022 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- The "Asia-Pacific Space Force Capability Structure" report has been added to's offering. This study provides an overview of the space force capacity structure of the Asia-Pacific With an increase in tensions and conflict zones across the globe, military space capabilities have expanded to anticipate threats, respond to crises, and project power, guiding the development of offensive and defensive strategies vital to national interests. The changing space environment has highlighted the role of space as a distinct warfighting domain representing disparate theories and strategies pertaining to space power. Russia and China's positions on space are evolving to encompass information-driven capabilities as a pre-requisite to non-contact warfare, targeting assets and critical infrastructure to deprive the adversary of space-enabled information without geographically engaging in the physical theater of conflict. The national security space postures of most countries in the Asia-Pacific, however, focus on deterring and countering threats from space that infringe on national, allied, and partner interests. These differences in military postures and capabilities have the potential to expose systemic cracks. With space becoming inextricably linked to crisis stability, major powers have begun developing counter-space capabilities to degrade and deter adversary spheres of influence. Strategic stability and deterrence postures are virtually non-existent in the space domain due to the lack of human casualties and first-strike instability, increasing the risk of escalation of terrestrial conflicts and disturbance of nuclear stability. The 1967 United Nations treaty signed by Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to regulate the use of space and provide a framework for international space law failed to address anti-satellite weapons, the weaponization of space, resource utilization in the context of cislunar operations, and space debris deposition. As a result, major powers continue to develop kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities, exploiting grey areas in the treaty to conduct military operations in space. The study focuses on China, India, Australia, Japan, and South Korea in terms of space force capabilities. It identifies the factors driving and restraining the industry in the region as well as the growth opportunities arising from the emerging changes that market players can leverage. Key Topics Covered: 1. Strategic Imperatives Why is it Increasingly Difficult to Grow?The Strategic ImperativeThe Impact of the Top 3 Strategic Imperatives on the Asia-Pacific Space Force Capability StructureGrowth Opportunities Fuel the Growth Pipeline Engine 2. Growth Opportunity Analysis Threat Assessment: Kinetic Physical and Non-kinetic PhysicalThreat Assessment: Electronic and CyberChina: Technology Capability AssessmentChina: Manufacturing Capability AssessmentChina: Manned Spaceflight and Cislunar OperationsChina: Space Launch CapabilityIndia: Technology Capability AssessmentIndia: Manufacturing Capability AssessmentIndia: Manned Spaceflight and Cislunar OperationsIndia: Space Launch CapabilityAustralia: Technology Capability AssessmentAustralia: Manufacturing Capability AssessmentAustralia: Space Launch CapabilityJapan: Technology Capability AssessmentJapan: Manufacturing Capability AssessmentJapan: Manned Spaceflight and Cislunar OperationsJapan: Space Launch CapabilitySouth Korea: Technology Capability AssessmentSouth Korea: Manufacturing Capability AssessmentSouth Korea: Manned Spaceflight and Cislunar OperationsSouth Korea: Space Launch CapabilityGrowth DriversGrowth Driver AnalysisGrowth RestraintsGrowth Restraint Analysis 3. Space Force Capability Structure - Asia-Pacific (APAC) Growth Opportunity 1: Advanced Cyber and Electronic Warfare CapabilitiesGrowth Opportunity 2: Multi-domain Army ConceptsGrowth Opportunity 3: Terrestrial Platform Advances For more information about this report visit

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